جستجوي پيشرفته | کتابخانه مجازی الفبا

ترجمه ماشینی: در این مصاحبه که در ژوئیه 2020 انجام شد، محمد اصغری، دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تبریز، یازده سوال (از طریق ایمیل) از پروفسور سوزان هاک، استاد برجسته فلسفه در دانشگاه میامی پرسید. . این فیلسوف آمریکایی مشتاقانه و با حوصله پاسخ سوالات را برای من ایمیل کرد. سؤالات این مصاحبه عمدتاً در مورد فلسفه تحلیلی و فلسفه پراگماتیست است. این مصاحبه از طریق ایمیل شخصی بین من و پروفسور سوزان هاک در ژوئیه 2020 انجام شد. این مصاحبه که پروفسور هاک مشتاقانه آن را پذیرفت، شامل یازده سوال در مورد بیوگرافی وی و نقش فیلسوفان مختلف در اندیشه او و در نهایت در مورد تأثیر فلسفه پراگماتیسم است. روی فکرش البته ناگفته نماند که کتاب فلسفه منطق در ایران هاک به فارسی ترجمه شده است و دو مقاله در فصلنامه پژوهش های فلسفی (دانشگاه تبریز) منتشر کرده است و یکی از مقالات او را نیز به فارسی ترجمه کرده ام. . آنچه برای من بسیار جالب بود تأثیر پراگماتیسم بر اندیشه هاک بود که چارلز سندرز پیرس، در میان پراگماتیست های کلاسیک آمریکایی، به همان اندازه که جان دیویی در اندیشه رورتی داشت، بر اندیشه این فیلسوف تأثیر داشت. در اینجا از پروفسور سوزان هاک تشکر می کنم که با حوصله و مشتاقانه به سوالات من پاسخ داد.

W. V. Quine borrows the principle of charity from Neil Wilson, but modifies and enriches its content to fit into his naturalistic philosophy and epistemology. While Wilson ties this principle to the notion of truth, Quine’s attempts in finding a ground for it lead him to the concept of common rationality shared by all human beings, which is ultimately what makes communication, as the basis of our social life, possible. According to the paper's argument, three other expressions, that is, the principles of psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection, which Quine uses in the contexts akin to that of the principle of charity, are not but different terms for one basic idea. Given the ties between the principle of charity and rationality, Quine's wide use of the principle and its affiliated notions proves that rationality is a central, often neglected, idea in his philosophy. The paper begins with an introductory account of the brief explanation Wilson gives of the principle of charity. Then it spells out four concepts or principles of charity, psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection showing how these four notions or principles basically express the same thing. Examining the relation of these last three principles with the principle of charity and rationality, the paper's main objective is to highlight the centrality of common rationality in Quine's philosophy, despite the common view that Quine is purely engaged with semantical aspects of Language.

HélèneCixous, the renowned contemporary philosopher and feminist, provides such a heretic account of femininity which transcends the feminist social or political movements. She believes that “the female” can create a new identity for itself, when keeps its distance from the masculine symbolic order. Of course, this has nothing to do with the absence of women in the cultural realm, rather the problem is that if the female aspects of human being are not to be eliminated, a new ontology is required to sustain it in a pointlessness situation, so that it can always resist the conventional perceptual patterns. In other words, the female can only make its identity and the nature of rationality dynamic, when it injects the strangeness in the masculine order. This means keeping a position on the margins of history, while also infusing the feminine energies into the symbolic body. In this research, we try to show that for Cixous, emergence of the new is dependent both on some kind of feminine otherness and the marginality. This can be realized by various dismantling tools such as women’s writing and polyphonic identities. Finally we make it clear that through the female otherness or being on the margins, the feminine can provide a way of thinking about those realities which have not been thought up so far in the symbolic rationality, or have always been rejected as the unthinkable.

In this paper, I argue for a new solution to Mary’s puzzle in Jackson’s famous knowledge argument. We are told that imprisoned Mary knows all facts or truths about color and color vision. On her release, she learns something new according to B-type of materialism and according to property dualism. I argue that this cognitive improvement can only be accounted for in terms of what Schellenberg has recently called “capacitism,” namely the claim that that experience is constitutively a matter of discriminating and singling out particulars by employing perceptual capacities. Of course, I am not claiming that knowing the phenomenal character is simply the possession of abilities, let alone that the phenomenal character is a sort of know-how. That is why my claim is not affiliated with Lewis and Nemirow's ability hypothesis position. I take for granted here a sort of property-representationalism, according to which the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on the cluster of properties that the respective experiences represent. On her release, Mary acquires those perceptual abilities on the basis of which she learns to discriminate all shades of color. And after applying her old physical concept RED to the shade of red, she comes to know what it is like to experience red (propositional knowledge).