چکیده :
در میان انبوه مباحث فلسفی و کلامی کمتر مسئلهای مانند چگونگی علم الهی به اشیاء قبل از پیدایش آنها معرکه آرای متفاوت و گهگاه متناقض شده است.
مجادلات درازدامن برانگیختهشده پیرامون این مسئله تا آنجا است که منتقدان و طرفداران دیدگاه نامآشناترین فیلسوف جهان اسلام، ابنسینا، در خصوص علم الهی به موجودات قبل از پیدایش را در دو سوی علم حصولی (صور مرتسمه) و حضوری (علم اجمالی کمالی) قرار داده است.
پژوهش حاضر کوشیده است ضمن ارائه و بیان این دو برداشت، و نقد و بررسی آنها، به این پرسش بنیادی پاسخ دهد که از دو دیدگاه یادشده که برای هر یک میتوان تصریحات، عبارات و مؤیداتی از کلام ابنسینا ارائه نمود، کدام یک با مبانی اساسی و خدشهناپذیر وی سازگاری بیشتری دارد.
سزاوار یادآوری است که با اندک جستجویی به سرعت و سهولت میتوان به مقالات و کتابهای بسیاری درباره علم الهی از منظر ابنسینا دست یافت -دستکم نگارنده خود دو مقاله پژوهشی اختصاصی و فصلهای نوشتهشده در کتابهای تألیفی دارد- لیکن پژوهشی مستقل در این باره نوشته نشده که همراه با نقد و بررسی و نگاه تحلیلی بر این باور باشد که ابنسینا را باید مبتکر علم اجمالی کمالی دانست، دیدگاهی که در سازگاری دقیق و پیوندی عمیق با مبانی بنیادی ابنسینا است.
perhaps it can be claimed that fewer philosophical and theological issues such as the issue of divine knowledge can be found about which this extent of different and sometimes contradictory opinions exist and it is due to these very differences of views that shaykh tusi states the following regarding the discussion of divine knowledge in his commentary on al-isharat [remarks and admonitions]: some people have completely denied divine knowledge and in this regard, avicenna’s view as the chief of the peripatetic philosophers in the islamic world has kindled extensive disputes.
so much so that shaykh tusi, a commentator of the book of al-isharat, who at the beginning considers himself to be committed to the commentary of al-isharat, does not stay loyal to this condition in the discussion of divine knowledge and follows shaykh ishraq in this issue.
this issue has gained so much popularity that avicenna considers divine knowledge of existents before their creation to be in the form of imprinted forms.
many books and articles have been written about divine knowledge in general and avicenna’s view specifically and that which distinguishes the present study is that apart from a critical view of the author regarding the accuracy and reliability of the attribution of imprinted forms to avicenna, the author, through analytical study and reflection on the expressions of avicenna and the explanation of his foundations, believes that avicenna must be considered the innovator of the theory of “perfect integrated-comprehensive knowledge” and in the first step of this study, after acknowledging the excessive difficulty of the issue of divine knowledge, the problem statement and point of conflict and avicenna’s view regarding god’s knowledge of existents before their creation is explained and it is claimed that avicenna must be considered the innovator of perfect integrated-comprehensive knowledge by citing his assertions and benefitting from all his other philosophical foundations.
after indicating the nature of knowledge and by mentioning two essential features of imprinted forms in the peripatetic system, the attribution of the theory of imprinted forms is analyzed and through presenting mirdamad’s view regarding the circumstances of the attribution of imprinted forms to avicenna, a solution has opened up before researchers.
and in confirmation of the rightness of mirdamad’s claim, avicenna’s statements clearly show that there are serious challenges in the dogmatism and indisputability of those who claim the attribution of imprinted forms to avicenna.
in continuation, by explaining the compatibility of perfect integrated-comprehensive knowledge with avicenna’s foundations, the difficult path to arriving at the reality of divine knowledge is smoothed to some extent and the ambiguities from the views of the most well-known philosopher of the islamic world can be removed.
addressing mulla sadra’s doubts regarding avicenna’s statements in al-shifaʾ [the book of healing] along with his answers to them shows that according to avicenna the divine realm is free of any type of acquired knowledge even actualized acquired knowledge and while refuting all types of multiplicity the idea that the divine essence is adorned and envisioned with the forms of existents is certainly not right and the three terms, essence, god’s knowledge of his essence, and god’s knowledge regarding others, are all expressing a single reality which is the essence of god.
and in precise scientific and technical terms, the basis of the words of the claimants to the attribution of actualized acquired knowledge arises from this false idea that they consider the rationality of the forms to come after their existence whereas avicenna’s statements, rational laws, and foundations assert that the existent that is simplex from all aspects possesses all the perfections at the essence level and all the acquired existents (immaterial existents) and contingent existents (material existents) are present for him in the divine realm due to the rational existence they possess.
avicenna’s emphasis and assertion on the selfsameness of essence and attributes in the denotative and conceptual sense consider god’s essence to be free of all types of multiplicity even the multiplicity of aspects and in contrast to mulla sadra’s view, which considers that the multiple assumptions presented in al-shifaʾ regarding the reality and depths of the essence show avicenna’s confusion and helplessness regarding the topic of divine knowledge, it must be considered a sign of strength and philosophizing and, ultimately, it is worthy of attention and mulla sadra himself considers avicenna’s assertions and admonitions regarding divine knowledge to attest to perfect integrated-comprehensive knowledge which is, in reality, another expression for comprehensive knowledge along with detailed revelation.