چکیده :
در این مقاله نشان داده میشود که همچنان که مردم اکثر باورهای خود را از طریق بسیاری وسائط بیرونی به معرفت مبدّل میکنند، نمیتوان معرفت را منحصر در باور موجهی دانست که توجیه آن به صورت درونی حاصل شده باشد.
اگر این باورهای مردم را معرفت ندانیم، گذشته از آن که گرفتار شکگرایی فراگیر خواهیم شد، بلکه با واقعیتِ معرفتهای بشری نیز مغایرت خواهد داشت.
پس برای کسب معرفتهایمان لزومی ندارد از درونگرایی استفاده کنیم.
برونگرایی نیز امکانات جدیدی را در اختیارمان قرار میدهد که میتوان از آن در فلسفه دین استفاده کرد.
سپس به چهار جریانی که از برونگرایی معرفتی استفاده کردهاند و به توثیق باورهای دینی پرداختهاند اشاره میشود.
همچنین نشان داده میشود معرفتشناسی دینیِ مبتنی بر شنیدههای اطمینانیافته در ادامه مسیر جان گرکو در معرفتشناسی دینی است که راهی مطمئن را برای توجیه باورهای دینی فراهم میآورد.
اما اگر از طریق شنیدههای اطمینانیافته توجیهی برای باورهای دینی داشتهباشیم، تمامی ادیان میتوانند ادعا کنند که پیروانشان از این طریق به باورهای دینیِ مخصوص خود باور داشتهاند، لذا باید موجّه باشند و در نتیجه تمامی ادیان معرفتهای راستینی را باید به دست دهند و این چیزی جز تکثرگرایی نیست.
نشان داده میشود اگر رهبران اولیه توجیه درستیِ آموزههای خود را به قرائتی که خود از امور قدسی دارند مبتنی کنند، به این سادگیها نمیتوان به ترجیح یک دین بر دیگری حکم کرد.
اما اگر آموزههای رهبر اولیه یک دین به یک حقیقت وجودی مثل خداوند مبتنی باشد، میتوان از حقانیت آن دین نسبت به سایر ادیان سخن گفت.
in this paper, it is shown that as people often convert their beliefs into knowledge through many external means, knowledge cannot be considered exclusive in a justified belief where its justification has been achieved internally.
if we do not consider these people’s beliefs as knowledge, we will face some problems; not only will we be caught up in pervasive skepticism but we would also be rejecting the reality of most human items of knowledge.
therefore, to acquire our knowledge, we do not need to use internalism as externalism provides us with new facilities.
philosophy of religion may achieve new solutions through this expansion in epistemology.
in this paper, four currents in the philosophy of religion that have used epistemological externalism are mentioned.
it is also shown that religious epistemology, based on the trusted hearings which follow greco’s path, provides a reliable way to justify religious beliefs.
however, if we have a justification for religious beliefs through reassured hearings, all religions can claim that their followers believe in their own religious beliefs in this way; so they must be justified, and therefore, all religions must acquire true knowledge, and this is nothing but pluralism.
but it seems that to explain the diversity of religions, we do not need to resort to religious pluralism.
it can be said that beliefs based on trusted hearings do not rely on their confidence only in the religious preachings, but their confidence in the religious preachings that have been transferred correctly and also that the religious preachings which are based on trusted hearings depend on another preaching and each has been assured through its previous preaching.
if some kind of mistrust occurs in this chain then the ultimate believer in the reliability of the narrated in this chain or their collection (in greco’s particular view) cannot turn his belief into knowledge with the necessary justification.
but the problem is what the end of the chain is based on.
in some religions, a person can believe in the ability to understand many spiritualities and he has attempted to convey his findings to others.
it is clear thatat the end of this chain, if it is the personal findings or readings of a person from spirituality, then the difference in spiritual reception among the early leaders can justify the diversity of religions.
therefore, this type of religious epistemology is dependent on the source of narrations.
but some religions speak of believing in an existential truth and one of the consequences of believing in his existence will also be to achieve spirituality.
they also believe that their early leaders have based their teachings on their confident hearings of that existential truth.
in the meantime, abrahamic religions believe in god as that existential truth.
if a religion (such as islam) can show the correctness of the chain of reassurance that leads to the prophet’s speech from god and also the prophet considers it not as his concept of spirituality but rather he has stated it because it is the same as the word sent by god, he can show the source of his teachings to be god.
what we should ultimately be sure about in this type of epistemology is that he has been able to establish a relationship with god and has conveyed god’s words.
in this paper, four paths are mentioned to achieve this assurance.