چکیده :
نظریه‌های ارزش در پی تعیین معیار خوب و بد برای افعال اخلاقی هستند.
به‌رغم تنوعی که در این نظریه‌ها وجود دارد هیچ‌یک تاکنون قابلیت انطباق بر افعال اخلاقی خداوند را نداشته‌اند.
ازآنجاکه معیارهای ارائه‌شده، همچون انگیزه فضیلت‌مندانه، وظیفه، لذت، سعادت و قرب‌الهی مختص انسان بوده و در مورد سنجش خوب و بد افعال الهی ناکارآمد هستند باید به دنبال نظریه ارزشی بود که بر همه فاعل‌های اخلاقی، اعم از انسان و خداوند قابل انطباق باشد.
در این نوشتار سعی بر آن است تا پس از بررسی مهم‌ترین نظریه‌های ارزش به روش تحلیلی، نظریه ارزشی معرفی شود که بتواند افعال الهی را نیز دربرگیرد.
نتایج نشان می‌دهد نظریه‌های فضیلت‌محوریِ فاعل‌مبنا و وظیفه‌گرایی برای سنجش افعال الهی کارایی ندارند.
فقط نظریه غایت‌گرای کمال‌گرا ـ که شامل فضیلت‌محوری غایت‌انگار نیز می‌شود ـ آن هم با تفسیری خاص، ظرفیت ارائه معیار برای افعال اخلاقی خداوند را دارد.
به‌نظر می‌رسد اگر غایت افعال اخلاقی، «صِرف کمال» در نظر گرفته شود در این صورت، زمانی که بر اثر فعل اختیاری فاعل، کمالی تحقق یافت، غایت اخلاقی حاصل شده است؛ حتی اگر آن کمال برای افرادی غیر از خود فاعل باشد.
بنابراین، به کمال‌رساندن مخلوقات از جانب خداوند که خود، کمال محض است عملی اخلاقی به‌شمار می‌رود.
introduction
the necessity of observing moral values by human beings is approved by every common sense and human nature; but does such a necessity also apply to the observance of moral values for god? if we accept that it is necessary for god to observe moral values, on what basis can we know whether god has acted morally or not? the truth is that knowing god as the moral agent and determining the theory of value god's actions has received less attention and no precise answer has been given.
value theories are responsible for determining the good and bad criteria for moral actions, and so far various value theories have been proposed to measure human moral actions.
the most well-known theories of moral value include teleological theories, virtue-based theories, and conscientious theories.
the fundamental problem in most of these theories is that they consider only man as a moral agent, and the criterion they offer is only for measuring the good and bad of human actions.
hence, in the face of the question of "whether god's actions are moral or not" they do not have a clear answer for the audience.
therefore, it is necessary to first examine whether we can basically consider god as a moral agent or whether the observance of moral values is only for man? second, if god's actions can also be morally valued, by what criteria can we understand their morality? are the criteria presented in the moral schools adaptable to god's actions, or should another theory of value be sought for god? in this research, we want to provide appropriate answers to such questions as possible.
methods
in this research, the analytical method has been used to examine the extent to which the theories of virtue oriented, deontological, and teleological are applied to the actions of god.
results and discussion
the first theory of value to be examined is the theory of virtue oriented.
of course, those virtue ethics's views that have considered the criterion of valuing characters and recognizing virtues from vices as their end are considered as teleological views, and any result obtained in examining the teleological view also includes teleological virtue ethics.
other virtue ethic's views are called agent-based virtue ethics, which say that the criterion for good and bad deeds is only their motive; not their goals and results.
according to this view, the existence of good motives for god causes good deeds to be issued from him, without pursuing a purpose from these deeds.
this criterion is not acceptable for conforming to god's actions; because god is wise and the requirement of wisdom is that all god's actions have a wise purpose.
the second theory of value is the deontological theory.
the general criterion in this theory is that an action is moral and right when it is done only because of duty.
since this cannot be assumed to be a duty to god, this view also cannot be chosen as a theory of value for measuring god's actions; because duty means where there is a right and the right cannot be achieved without ownership.
god is the owner of everything; therefore, no one has the right to oblige him to do something.
the third theory under consideration is teleologicalism.
the general criterion in teleology is this: if something leads us to the desired result, it is good, and if it leads us away from that result, it is bad.
we have said that god is wise and the requirement of wisdom is that all god's actions have a purpose; therefore, the main criterion of teleology is compatible with god's moral actions.
but purposes such as profit, pleasure, power, and happiness, which have been proposed in kinds of teleological theories such as consequentialism and perfectionism, are all appropriate to man and cannot be considered as purposes for god.
nevertheless, the concept of "perfection" is one of the concepts that has the capacity to be presented to god; because god is absolute perfection, and god's wisdom requires that the actions that come from him be commensurate with his inherent perfection.
thus, a new interpretation of perfectionism can be offered that includes the actions of god.
to do this, the circle of the moral agent must be considered beyond man so that god is also known as the moral agent.
then, the realization of "mere perfection", without restricting it to man, was considered as the purpose of moral actions.
in this case, each of the moral actors will aim at the realization of perfection, and this perfection, according to the nature of each moral actor, can have different instances.
for example, man's goal can be his own perfection and god's goal can be the perfection of creatures; because the goal is the realization of perfection, and if a moral act leads to the realization of perfection for a person other than the doer, the moral goal is still achieved.
conclusion
according to what has been said, our proposed theory, as a theory of value that can be applied to both human and god's actions, is a perfectionist teleological theory - which also includes a teleological virtue ethics - with the interpretation that we consider the purpose of moral actions to be the mere realization of perfection.
according to this theory, a good deed is an action that is compatible with perfection, and a bad deed is an action that is incompatible with perfection.
this perfection is either the perfection of the moral agent himself or the perfection of a being other than the moral agent.
therefore, the perfection of creatures by god, which is itself pure perfection, is a moral act