جستجوي پيشرفته | کتابخانه مجازی الفبا

Moral realism is the doctrine that some propositions asserting that some action is ‘morally’ good (obligatory, bad, or wrong) are true. This paper examines three different definitions of what it is for an action to be ‘morally’ good (with corresponding definitions for ‘morally’ obligatory, bad, or wrong) which would make moral realism a clear and plausible view. The first defines ‘morally good as ‘overall important to do’; and the second defines it as ‘overall important to do for universalizable reasons’. The paper argues that neither of these definitions is adequate; and it develops the view of Cuneo and Shafer-Landau that we need a definition which is partly in terms of paradigm examples of morally good actions, which they call ‘moral fixed points’. Hence the third and final definition is that an action is morally good if it is ‘overall important to do because this follows from a fundamental universalizable principle, belonging to a system of such principles which includes almost all the moral fixed points; when a suggested fundamental principle is one which would be shown to be very probably true by the exercise of reflective equilibrium over many centuries’.

The current Cyber-ethics in Western societies (and its followers in other societies) have been compiled based on secularist presupposition. This presupposition has different principles in comparison with the Islamic attitude which can lead one to take a different approach toward ethical problems. This paper is an attempt to propose principles of Islamic cyber-ethics upon which we can prepare answers for the problems of cyber-ethics, having evident characteristics of an Islamic approach that are distinguished from secularist answers. After a prefatory study on the background of the Islamic attitude to ethics, these characteristics will be propounded under four categories: fundamental and content components, spiritual components, legal components, and penal components. Under these categories, themes such as giving importance to agent goodness, the basic difference in one’s goal of living an ethical life, the relation of reason and revelation, and the basis for the legitimacy of the penal justice system will be discussed. Needless to say, this paper does not seek to prepare arguments for this model, and such arguments can be discussed in other philosophical investigations.

The monotheistic religions that valorize love typically believe that their love for God should be extended to God's creatures and, in particular, to one's fellow human beings. Yet, in practice, the love of the Christian or Muslim or Hindu monotheist doesn't always extend to the love of the religious other. Precisely how, then, should the adherents of the major monotheistic religions respond to the obvious diversity of these religions? The arguments of philosophical theology largely depend on what John Henry Newman called our "illative sense" or faculty of informal reasoning. Even the most fully developed illative sense can vary from one person to another, however. As a consequence, Christian, Muslim, and Hindu monotheists are unlikely to fully agree on matters of philosophical theology. I argue that this precludes neither mutual respect, though, nor a rational adherence to the philosophical and theological views of one's own tradition.