منطق قصدی - منطق مبتنی بر رئالیسم فلسفی [کتاب انگلیسی] | کتابخانه مجازی الفبا

Table of contents :
PART ONE-THE GENERAL ISSUE OF INTENTIONALITY IN LOGIC
CHAPTER I AN INTRODUCTORY CHALLENGE
CHAPTER II ON THE IDEA OF AN INTENTIONAL LOGIC
a Philosophical realism as providing the context for an intentional logic
b The cognitive relation understood as a relation of identity
c The logical instruments of such cognitive identity: their distinction from and dependence upon psychological processes
d Logical instruments understood as intentions or formal signs
1 Natural and conventional signs
2 Formal and instrumental signs
3 The current tendency to confuse formal signs with instrumental signs, and some of its consequences
e The distinction of the logical from the real
f Logic and metaphysics: a knowledge of the logical as dependent on a knowledge of the real
g Logical forms understood as intentional relations of identity
I Concerning the nature of logical forms
2 The relation of intentional identity
h Summary and conclusion
CHAPTER III MATHEMATICAL LOGIC AND THE DISREGARD OF lNTENTIONALITY
a The failure to distinguish intentional forms from nonintentional forms, and the consequent confusion of the real with the logical
b The formalism of mathematical logic
c Mathematical logic considered as relying wholly on instrumental signs and neglecting formal signs altogether
d How the mathematical logician not only introduces real relations into logic, but also treats of logical relations in such a way as to turn them into nonintentional or real relations
e A possible reply of the mathematical logician: truths of logic are different from truths about the real
1 My use of the distinction between the logical and the real
2 Analytic truth as a suggested criterion of the logical
f Criticism of the notion that some sort of analytic truth or logical truth can serve as a criterion of the subject matter of mathematical logic
1 The criterion of analytic truth as being quite irrelevant to the distinction between the logical and the real as I have been using it
2 The criterion of analytic truth as being inadequate and inapplicable as a means of differentiating mathematical logic from natural science
a) The analytic as based on mere human convention
b) The analytic as based on nonconventional meanings
c) The old problem of a lack of an adequate criterion of analytic truth
d) Professor White's criticism of the analytic
3 Conclusion to be drawn from the elimination of the notion of the analytic as a criterion of the logical
g Mathematical logic as concerned with real natures and essences
1 Defense of the distinction between essence and accident
2 Why the problem of a criterion is not pertinent to the distinction of essence from accident, and is pertinent to the distinction of analytic from synthetic
3 Summary and conclusion regarding the ontological status of the subject matter of mathematical logic
4 A final qualification: mathematical logical entities may be said to be real only in the sense in which mathematical entities may be said to be real
h Some difficulties connected with the notion of purely formal systems and their interpretation
I The notion of logical syntax
2 The notion of the semantical dimension of logical syntax
3 The notion of logical propositions as mere tautologies
4 The extrasystematic rules of formal systems
a) The supposedly arbitrary character of these rules
b) The infinite regress in metalanguages
5 An unresolved problem: uninterpreted formal systems conceived
of as having sufficient generality so as to be susceptible of interpretations either for intentional or for nonintentional forms
PART TWO-THE IMPORT OF INTENTIONALITY WITH RESPECT TO THE TRADITIONAL SUBDIVISIONS OF LOGIC
CHAPTER IV THE CONCEPT
A The account of the concept in an intentional logic
1 Concepts as concepts of essences
2 Concepts as concepts of existing essences
3 Concerning the abstraction of concepts from sensory experience and how this is likely to be misunderstood
4 Concerning the abstraction of concepts from sensory experience and how this is rightly to be understood
5 Concerning the evidence for sensory realism
a The distinction between the sensibile per se and the sensibile per accidens
b The problem of error in regard to what is sensed only by accident
c Summary of the usual arguments that are advanced against the givenness of physical things, and how they may be answered
d Can the argument over what is given in sense and how much is given ever be resolved
6 The categories as a classification of what things are
7 Analogous concepts
a Why we must have concepts that get at realities that both pervade and transcend the categories
b Why being cannot be regarded merely as a highest genus
c Other suggested alternatives as to how the concept of being might be treated
d Being as analogous
e Being considered as analogous is the least abstract and the most concrete of all concepts
f The import of a doctrine of analogy for logic
8 Concepts as universals
9 Why universals are indispensable in knowledge
10 The supposed dilemma of nominalism vs. extreme realism
11 Universals as relations of identity
12 Further features of concepts: their extension, comprehension, definition, etc.
B The nature and function of the concept in mathematical logic
1 The neglect of the concept
2 Classes as substitutes for concepts
a A nominalistic justification of classes
b How such a nominalism with respect to classes is to be regarded from the point of view of an intentional logic
c The status of classes from the point of view of intentional logic
d A certain difficulty considered
e A second difficulty and its solution
3 Propositional functions as substitutes for concepts
a Superficial similarity of concepts and propositional functions
b The more profound difference between concepts and propositional functions
c Again the contrast between intentional relations and nonintentional relations
d The import for logic of the attempted substitution of propositional functions for concepts
4 The neglect in modern logic of anything resembling either a doctrine of the categories or a doctrine of analogy
5 The paradoxes and their supposed import for logic
a A restriction and reclassification of the paradoxes, in the light of their pertinence to an intentional logic
b Statement of the conceptual paradoxes from an intentional point of view
c The solution of the paradoxes as proposed by the mathematical logicians and its inadequacies from an intentional point of view
A suggested approach to a solution along lines quite different from those followed by mathematical logicians
A proposed solution of the conceptual paradoxes
A final postscript on the conceptual paradoxes
The liar paradox
First formulation of the paradox
Second formulation of the paradox
A possible difficulty: can the two formulations really
be distinguished on the ground that the first is self-contradictory, but not meaningless, whereas the second is meaningless and hence not self-contradictory 1
CHAPTER V THE PROPOSITION
A The nature and function of the proposition in an intentional logic
I The intentional function of the proposition
a Propositions and the intention of existence
b Some difficulties in the intention of existence
c The structure of the proposition: existence propositions and subject-predicate propositions
d The subject-predicate structure of the proposition as determined by the relational structure of the concept
e The relation of identity as the proper instrument for intending existence
f The functions of existence propositions and of subject-predicate propositions compared
II The composition of being as determining the composition of terms in a proposition
a The need for further intentional flexibility and complexity in propositional forms
b The doctrine of the predicables
I Accident
2 Property
3 Species
4 Transition to generic and differentiating predicates: the contrast between predicables with respect to individuals and predicables with respect to essences
5 Genus and differentia
6 A brief note on definition
c The doctrine of the predicables and unities of order
1 The ontological difference between substantial or essential unities and unities of order
2 Unities of order as intended by subject-predicate propositions
III The property of designation as it pertains to concepts in propositions
a A right understanding of the proposition requires that the terms of the proposition be considered with respect to something beside their mere meaning or signification
b The property of designation as making intelligible the proposition's intention of existence through a relation of identity
c Some general features of the property of designation
d Various kinds of designation
1 Division based on the principle of the different kinds of existence that may be designated
2 Division into exclusive and inclusive designation
a) A property of inclusive designation: ascent and descent
b) The relevance to designation of a term's position as subject or as predicate
e A final difficulty: the difference between the designation and the extension of a concept
B The proposition in mathematical logic
I The theory of the relational structure of the proposition
a The confusion of real relations with logical relations
1 Propositions as relational structures and propositiond functions as matrices of these structures
2 The reaction of an intentional logician to such a theory of propositions
a) Real relations are confused with logical relations
b) How are real predicamental relations to be intended-a problem for the intentional logician
c) A complex concept as an instrument for intending accidental unity
cl) The intention of unities of order through complex concepts and subject-predicate propositions
e ) Conclusion: propositional functions from the point of view of an intentional logic
b The confusion of logical relations with real relations
II Quantification theory
a Quantification in mathematical logic as compared with designation in intentional logic
b Universal and particular quantification
c Criticism of the supposed necessity of eliminating the subject concepts from propositions
a) Confusion of the logical relation of subject and predicate with the real situation of individuals in relation
b) Predicates as applied not just to individuals, but to individuals of a certain kind, i.e., individuals that come under a certain concept
2 Criticism of the supposed necessity of turning universal propositions into hypotheticals and particulars into conjunctions
3 Criticism of the supposedly existential import of particular propositions and the nonexistential import of universals
4 The problem of the null class and its bearing on the existential import of propositions
a) The traditional square of opposition disposed of
b) Restatement of the problem from the point of view of an intentional logic
c ) A change of example and a sharpening of the issue: Is the present king of France not bald?
d) An analysis of the peculiar type of designation involved in propositions about nonexistents
e ) Solution of the problem of the present king of France
f ) A few miscellaneous items disposed of
c Quantification in the context of the many-termed relational structure of propositional functions
1 Rejoinder to these arguments
2 The technique of descent, as being both sufficient in itself and superior to the similar methods of analysis in mathematical logic, and yet at the same time far inferior in the matter of notation
III Two alternative theories of the proposition: the proposition as a relation between classes and the proposition as involving either an analytic or a synthetic relationship between terms
a The incompatibility of both theories with the main theory of the proposition as advanced in mathematical logic
b The contrast between an intentional relation between subject and predicate and the nonintentional relations of class membership and class inclusion
c Why the relation between subject and predicate is not to be understood in terms of the distinction between analytic and synthetic
CHAPTER VI ARGUMENT
A Argument in intentional logic
I The function of argument
a Argument considered as a means of making propositions evident
b Argument as an instrument of demonstration through causes
1 Accidental predicates as demonstrated through causes
2 The problem of essential predicates and their demonstration
3 The self-evidence and indemonstrability of definitional predicates
4 Definitional predicates as demonstrable a posteriori but not a priori
II The form of argument : a defense of the syllogism
a Current vagueness regarding the mediating function of the middle term
b Causation as a suggested means of logical mediation in the syllogism
c Identity as the means of logical mediation
1 The relation of identity as posing a dilemma between tautology and contradiction
2 The avoidance of the dilemma in the case of the proposition
3 The avoidance of the dilemma in the case of the syllogism
a) Causal transaction as providing a real unity sufficient to found a logical relation of identity
b) How the relation of triple identity intends a real causal transaction
c ) Explanation of why so many arguments do not seem to be syllogistic
d Summary and conclusion
III Inductive argument
a Induction considered as relevant to an intentional logic and irrelevant to a mathematical logic
b The pertinence of inductive demonstration to the various predicable relationships
c The mutual supplementation of induction by deduction and of deduction by induction, as well as the common orientation of both toward the intention of the given real world
d The problem of explanation by hypothesis
1 The use of hypotheses in modern science
2 A suggested interpretation of explanation by hypothesis that would integrate it into an intentional and realistic logic
IV Compound propositions and their relevance to the topic of argument
a The objects intended by compound propositions
b A proposed classification of propositional compounds
1 The basic contrast between categorical propositions and hypotheticals
2 Compound propositions : hypothetical compounds and categorical compounds
3 Compound propositions : conjunctive compounds and implicative compounds, and what they intend
4 Implicative compounds as syllogisms
B Argument in mathematical logic
I The confusion of real relations with logical relations
a Transitivity as a principle of inference
1 Statement of the thesis
2 The counterthesis : transitivity as a real property of real things and hence not a logical principle at all
3 Objections to this counterthesis
4 A reply to these obj ections : detailed analysis of a transitive relation showing the difference between the relation that is the object of an intention and the relation through which it is intended
5 A final objection and its answer
b Other properties of relations besides transitivity and their supposed relevance to inference
II The confusion of logical relations with real relations
a Transitivity once more
I The intentional relation of identity considered as merely a transitive relation
2 The isomorphism of transitive relations
b The status of transitivity determined
I Transitivity as a property of real relations
2 Transitivity as a property of the intentional relation of identity
c Exhibit of the difference between a nonintentional transitive relation and an intentional transitive relation
III The basic theory of proof in mathematical logic
a Formalization of proof
I Formalism as the basic principle of all demonstration
2 Formalism as supposedly entailing a lack of intentionality
3 Confusion of the form of the object intended with the form of the intention
4 The supposed evidence for such so-called formalization of proofs
b The rules of proof
1 Are rules of proof in the nature of second intentions?
2 Rules of proof conceived as making possible the formalization of proof
3 The mechanization of proof conceived as something of psychological, but not of logical import
4 The common source of these confusions; summary and conclusion
IV Concerning the class and propositional calculi
a Cursory disposition of the class calculus
b Confusion of intentional relations with nonintentional relations in the propositional calculus
1 The truth-functional interpretation of propositional relations
2 The incompatibility of the truth-functional character of these relations with their intentional function
c A possible reinterpretation of the calculus that would make it compatible with an intentional logic
d Does the propositional calculus upset the claim of the syllogism to be the exclusive instrument of deductive demonstration ?
1 The difference between mediate and immediate inference and its interpretation from the point of view of an intentional logic
2 The propositional calculus viewed as a demonstration of types and varieties of immediate inference
3 The demonstrations of these forms of immediate inference must themselves be syllogistic
4 Theorems that are improper and irrelevant to the propositional calculus
"Concluding Unscientific Postscript"
Notes And References
Index