تکامل متافیزیک مدرن: معنابخشی به اَشیاء [کتاب انگلیسی] | کتابخانه مجازی الفبا

Table of contents :
Cover......Page 1
The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics......Page 3
THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Dedication......Page 9
Contents......Page 11
Preface......Page 19
1. The Definition of Metaphysics......Page 25
2. ‘The Most General ...’......Page 26
3. ‘... Attempt ...’......Page 28
4. ‘... to Make Sense of Things’......Page 29
5. Metaphysics and Self-Conscious Reflection......Page 31
6. Three Questions......Page 32
(a) The Transcendence Question......Page 33
(b) The Novelty Question......Page 34
(c) The Creativity Question......Page 37
(d) The Significance of the Three Questions......Page 38
7. The Importance of Metaphysics......Page 40
8. Prospectus......Page 45
PART ONE THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD......Page 47
1. Introduction......Page 49
2. The Nature of the Project: Metaphysics as Providing Science with Foundations......Page 50
3. The Execution of the Project......Page 53
4. The Shape of Descartes’ System. Its Epistemology......Page 60
5. Analogues of Descartes’ Argument for the Existence of God in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy......Page 62
6. ‘The Disenchantment of the World’......Page 64
1. Introduction......Page 68
2. Substance......Page 69
3. Nature, Human Nature, and the Model of Human Nature......Page 74
4. Making Sense of Things as an Ethical Achievement......Page 80
5. The Three Kinds of Knowledge......Page 82
6. Metaphysical Knowledge as Knowledge of the Second Kind......Page 88
1. The Apotheosis of Making Sense of Things......Page 91
2. The Problem of Theodicy......Page 93
3. Leibniz’ System......Page 95
4. Leibniz’ Various Modal Distinctions......Page 102
5. Leibniz’ Solution to the Problem of Theodicy. Its Unsatisfactoriness......Page 107
1. Empiricism and Scepticism in Hume......Page 111
2. The Semantic Element in Hume’s Empiricism and the Epistemic Element in Hume’s Empiricism......Page 114
3. Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact......Page 119
4. Metaphysics as an Experimental Science of Human Nature......Page 121
5. Metaphysics as More Than an Experimental Science of Human Nature......Page 124
Appendix: Scepticism About Human Reasoning......Page 128
1. Introduction......Page 131
2. Bad Metaphysics and Good Metaphysics......Page 133
3. Synthetic A Priori Knowledge......Page 136
4. How Synthetic A Priori Knowledge Is Possible: Transcendental Idealism......Page 140
5. Good Metaphysics: The ‘Transcendental Analytic’......Page 147
6. Bad Metaphysics: The ‘Transcendental Dialectic’......Page 148
7. The Regulative Use of Concepts......Page 154
8. Thick Sense-Making and Thin Sense-Making......Page 157
9. Sense-Making That Is Neither Straightforwardly Thin nor Straightforwardly Thick......Page 161
10. The Unsatisfactoriness of Kant’s Metaphysics......Page 164
Appendix: Transcendental Idealism Broadly Construed......Page 166
1. German Philosophy in the Immediate Aftermath of Kant......Page 167
2. The Choice Between Transcendentalism and Naturalism......Page 169
3. Fichte’s System I: The Subject’s Intuition of Itself......Page 175
4. Fichte’s System II: Conditions of the Subject’s Intuition of Itself. The System’s Self-Vindication......Page 179
Appendix: Shades of Fichte in Kant......Page 183
1. Preliminaries......Page 186
2. Hegel’s Recoil from Kant’s Transcendental Idealism......Page 188
3. ‘What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational’......Page 191
4. Hegel’s Logic and the Absolute Idea......Page 193
5. Three Concerns......Page 198
6. Shades of Spinoza in Hegel?......Page 201
7. Contradiction, Reason, and Understanding......Page 206
8. Hegel Contra Kant Again. Absolute Idealism......Page 211
9. The Implications for Metaphysics......Page 215
PART TWO THE LATE MODERN PERIOD I THE ANALYTIC TRADITION......Page 217
1. What Is Frege Doing Here?......Page 219
2. The Project: Arithmetic as a Branch of Logic......Page 223
3. The Execution of the Project......Page 226
4. Sense and Bedeutung......Page 231
5. The Admissibility of Definitions......Page 233
6. The Objectivity of Sense. The Domain of Logic......Page 235
(a) The Set of Sets That Do Not Belong to Themselves......Page 240
(b) The Property of Being a Horse......Page 241
8. The Implications for Metaphysics......Page 244
1. Why Two Wittgensteins?......Page 246
2. Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy......Page 247
3. The Vision of the Tractatus......Page 251
4. Logic. Wittgenstein Contra Frege and Kant......Page 255
5. ‘Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes my propositions as nonsensical’......Page 259
6. Two Approaches to the Tractatus. A Rapprochement?......Page 262
7. Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus......Page 265
8. Metaphysics in the Service of Ethics......Page 272
1. Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy: A Reprise......Page 279
2. Differences Between the Early Work and the Later Work......Page 281
3. Metaphysics, Necessity, and Grammar......Page 285
4. Transcendental Idealism in the Later Work?......Page 292
5. Distinguishing Between the ‘Everyday’ and the ‘Metaphysical’......Page 295
6. Taking Words Away from Their Everyday to a Metaphysical Use?......Page 299
1. Logical Positivism......Page 303
2. Carnap’s Version of Logical Positivism. Linguistic Frameworks......Page 305
(a) Hume......Page 307
(b) Kant......Page 308
(c) Frege18......Page 310
(d) The Early Wittgenstein......Page 311
(e) The Later Wittgenstein......Page 313
(a) Quine......Page 314
(b) Heidegger......Page 315
(a) The Implications for Metaphysics on Carnap’s Own Conception of Metaphysics......Page 316
(b) The Implications for Metaphysics on My Conception of Metaphysics......Page 319
(c) Carnap on Alternative Conceptions of Metaphysics......Page 320
6. Tu Quoque?......Page 321
1. Introduction......Page 326
(a) Quine’s Empiricism......Page 327
(b) Quine’s Naturalism......Page 328
(c) Quine’s Physicalism......Page 329
3. Relations Between Quine’s Empiricism, Naturalism, and Physicalism......Page 330
4. Some Distinctions Rejected .........Page 336
5. ... and a New One Introduced......Page 340
6. Quinean Metaphysics I: An Overview......Page 342
7. Quinean Metaphysics II: Ontology......Page 345
8. Objections to Quine’s Naturalism53......Page 348
Appendix: Can Quine Consistently Reject the Distinctions He Rejects and Espouse the Indeterminacy/Underdetermination Distinction?......Page 351
1. Analytic Philosophy in the Immediate Aftermath of Quine......Page 353
2. Lewis’ Quinean Credentials; or, Lewis: Empiricist, Naturalist, Physicalist......Page 355
3. Modal Realism......Page 359
4. Concerns About Modal Realism. The Concerns Removed, but the Shortcomings of Lewis’ Metaphysics Thereby Revealed......Page 363
1. In Retrospect and in Prospect......Page 369
2. Realism and Anti-Realism......Page 374
(a) First Reply......Page 379
(b) Second Reply......Page 381
(c) Third Reply......Page 384
4. Is Anti-Realism a Form of Transcendental Idealism?......Page 386
5. In Further Retrospect and in Further Prospect......Page 390
PART THREE THE LATE MODERN PERIOD II NON-ANALYTIC TRADITIONS......Page 393
1. Introduction......Page 395
2. Truth, the Pursuit of Truth, and the Will to Truth......Page 397
3. Prospects for Metaphysics I: Perspectivism......Page 403
4. Prospects for Metaphysics II: Grammar......Page 407
5. Prospects for Metaphysics III: Transcendence......Page 410
6. Nietzsche’s Vision. Truth Again......Page 412
(a) Nietzsche Pro Spinoza73......Page 420
(b) Nietzsche Contra Hegel79......Page 422
8. Eternal Return......Page 424
1. Introduction......Page 430
2. Analysis (or Intelligence) versus Intuition......Page 431
3. Space versus Duration. The Actual versus the Virtual. The Real versus the Possible......Page 435
4. Identity versus Difference......Page 443
(a) Bergson Compared with Fichte......Page 444
(b) Bergson Compared with Spinoza and Nietzsche......Page 445
(a) The Implications for Metaphysics on Bergson’s Own Conception of Metaphysics......Page 446
(c) The Implications for Metaphysics on the Intuitive Conception of Metaphysics......Page 449
1. Husserl Vis-à-Vis the Analytic Tradition......Page 453
2. The Phenomenological Reduction......Page 456
3. Why Husserl Is Unlike Descartes (But Not Unlike Wittgenstein)......Page 459
4. The Execution of the Project......Page 463
5. The Eidetic Reduction......Page 468
6. Idealism in Husserl......Page 471
7. Husserl as Metaphysician......Page 479
(a) First Characterization......Page 483
(b) Second Characterization......Page 485
(c) Third Characterization......Page 486
3. The Execution of the Project. Dasein......Page 490
4. Overcoming the Tradition......Page 495
5. Heidegger as Metaphysician......Page 501
6. Metaphysics as Poetry......Page 503
7. Idealism in Heidegger?......Page 509
2. Absolute Presuppositions and Metaphysics as the Study of Them......Page 517
(b) Kant......Page 524
(c) Hegel (and Bergson)......Page 526
(d) The Later Wittgenstein......Page 527
(e) Carnap and the Logical Positivists......Page 529
(f) The Phenomenologists......Page 531
4. Collingwood’s Conservatism. The Possibilities Afforded by Non-Propositional Sense-Making......Page 532
(a) Derrida Pro Heidegger......Page 536
(b) Derrida Contra Husserl......Page 540
3. Speech and Writing......Page 542
4. Deconstruction......Page 551
5. Différance......Page 554
6. How to Do Things with Words......Page 559
7. Whither Metaphysics?......Page 562
Appendix: The Distinction Between Using an Expression and Mentioning It......Page 563
1. Introduction......Page 566
2. A Third (Themed) Retrospective......Page 567
(a) Deleuze’s Three Great Heroes: Bergson, Nietzsche, Spinoza......Page 569
(c) Leibniz......Page 574
(d) Hume......Page 575
(e) Kant......Page 576
(f) Heidegger......Page 577
3. Difference......Page 578
4. The Execution of the Project. Sense......Page 584
(a) Representation......Page 592
(b) Common Sense and Good Sense......Page 593
(c) Clarity and Distinctness......Page 594
(d) Four Assumptions......Page 595
6. The Nature of Problems, the Nature of Concepts, and the Nature of Philosophy; or, Metaphysics as the Creation of Concepts......Page 596
(a) The Transcendence Question......Page 602
(b) The Creativity Question......Page 603
(c) The Novelty Question......Page 604
1. Varieties of Sense-Making......Page 605
2. History......Page 609
(a) Consent......Page 612
An Interlude on Vagueness......Page 614
(b) Dissent......Page 617
4. Creation and Innovation in Metaphysics......Page 619
5. Metaphysics as a Humanistic Discipline......Page 624
Bibliography......Page 631
Index......Page 675