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Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction: “What Can We Make of These Strange Coincidences?”
The Argument
1 Four Preliminary Investigations
Introduction
1.1. Do Arguments Really Change Minds?
1.2. A Recent History: Paley to Present
1.3. Possibility and Probability
1.3.1. The Conceptual Landscape of Possibility
1.3.2. Conceivability and Modal Fallibilism
1.3.3. Skeptical Challenges to Modal Fallibilism
1.3.4. The Conceptual Landscape of Probability
1.3.5. Brute Facts, Chance, and the Two Modal Objections
1.4. Inductive Strategies
1.4.1. The Likelihood Principle and Bayesian Probability
1.4.2. Inference to the Best Explanation (Abductive Reasoning)
1.4.3. Dembski’s “Design Inference”
1.5. Science and Metaphysics
1.5.1. Why Metaphysics Won’t Just Go Away
1.5.2. Scientific Realism in Physics and Cosmology
1.5.3. Metaphysical Methodology
2 Our Fine-Tuned Universe?
Introduction
2.1. “Fine-Tuning” and Contingency
2.1.1. Fine-Tuned for What?
2.2. The Problem of the Infinite Lottery
2.2.1. Three Mathematical Solutions: Pruss, Vallentyne, and Jaynes
2.2.2. Two Pragmatic Solutions: Barnes and Collins
2.2.3. The Infinite Lottery and the Partition Problem
2.3. The Science of Fine-Tuning
2.3.1. Fine-Tuning in Particle Physics
2.3.2. Fine-Tuning in Quantum Mechanics
2.3.3. Fine-Tuning in Cosmology
2.3.4. Fine-Tuning and Metaphysics
2.3.5. Three Objections
2.4. Our “Fine-Tuned” Universe?
3 Learning From the Critics
Introduction
I. Objections to All Fine-Tuning Inferences
3.1. OSEs Make Fine-Tuning Inferences Problematic
3.2. FTAs Suffer From the “Problem of Old Evidence”
3.3. Fine-Tuning Does Not Require an Explanation
3.4. Inferences From Effects to Causes Are Problematic
3.5. Rearranging the Parameter Space Can Change the Quantity of the Apparent Fine-Tuning for a Given Constant
3.6. FTAs Involve Cherry-Picked Data
3.7. Theories Are Fine-Tuned, Not the World
3.8. There Are Absurd Analogous Arguments
3.9. None of the Available Hypotheses Are Falsifiable or Make Testable Predictions
3.10. Fine-Tuning Arguments Make Controversial Presuppositions About What Constitutes the Essence of a Universe
II. Objections to the Theistic Inference
3.11. Theism Is a “God-of-the-Gaps” Explanation
3.12. Theism Is Not an Explanation at All (Or, at Least, Not a Very Good One)
3.13. Assuming That God Would Prefer Life Is Question Begging
3.14. Fine-Tuning Actually Lowers the Probability of God’s Existence
3.15. The Initial State of the Universe Could Not Have Been Designed
3.16. The Universe Contains Significant Design Flaws
3.17. Assuming One Designer Rather Than Many Is Unmotivated
III. Objections to the Multiverse Inference
3.18. The Multiverse Inference Commits an “Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy” or Violates the “Requirement of Total Evidence”
3.19. The Multiverse Hypothesis Offers the Wrong Kind of Explanation
3.20. The Multiverse Hypothesis Is Ontologically Extravagant
3.21. The Multiverse Would Have to Be “Fine-Tuned” for the Inclusion of Life-Evolving Universes
3.22. Summary of Results
4 Mapping the Logical Space
Introduction
4.1. The Conservative Logical Space and Unconceived Alternatives
4.2. Quantum Mechanics to the Rescue?
4.2.1. Copenhagen Metaphysics
4.2.2. The Metaphysics of “Many-Worlds”
4.2.3. Relational Metaphysics
4.2.4. Summary of Results
4.3. First Option: Brute Fact Hypothesis
4.4. Second Option: Multiverse Hypothesis
4.5. Third Option: Minimal Theistic Hypothesis
4.5.1. Weaker and Stronger Theisms
4.5.2. Objections to the Coherence of Minimal Theism
4.6. Fourth and Fifth Options: Unconceived Alternatives
4.7. Summary and Evaluation
5 Our Fine-Tuned Actual World?
Introduction
5.1. Possible Worlds and LEGO Worlds
5.2. Metric Spaces and Alpha-Similar Possible Worlds
5.3. A “Sherlock Holmes Argument” for Minimal Theism
5.4. Objections New and Old
5.4.1. The Modal Realism Assumption
5.4.2. The Unknown Truths Assumption
5.4.3. The Brute Fact Probability Assumption
5.4.4. The Minimal Theism Probability Assumption
5.4.5. The Truth Assumption
5.5. Conclusions: Can I Believe It? Must I Believe It?
Bibliography
Index