چکیده :
مقاله حاضر با نگاهی تحلیلی-انتقادی به بررسی دیدگاه برنارد ویلیامز در مورد مسئولیت اخلاقی میپردازد.
در حالیکه شهودات اخلاقی ما و نظریههای اخلاقی مبتنی بر آنها مانند کانت، بر آن است که تمام انسان‌ها به لحاظ برخورداری یکسان از عقل و اختیار، از مسئولیت اخلاقی برابری برخوردارند، یعنی تحسین و سرزنش آنها مشروط به این عناصر غیرتجربی و عمل حاصل از آنهاست، برنارد ویلیامز با نگاهی ارسطو‌مآبانه، بنیان مسئولیت اخلاقی را تجربی دانسته و با گسستن پیوند ضروری بین اختیار و مسئولیت اخلاقی، شهودات اخلاقی ما و نظریه کانت و امثال آن را به چالش میکشد.
وی با ابتکار شانس اخلاقی و استناد به آن، حتی عمل ارادی انسان را متأثر از شانس مقوم (یعنی ظرفیت‌ها، استعدادها، و توانایی‌های درونی هر فرد)و شانس منتج (یعنی عوامل مختلف روان‌شناختی، اجتماعی، فرهنگی، سیاسی، اقتصادی و ...
مؤثر بر نتیجه عمل)دانسته و با نقض عمل کاملا اختیاری، مسئولیت اخلاقی را مفهومی سطحی یا ناخالص قلمداد میکند.وی در مواجهه با مشکل مسئولیت اخلاقی، تقریری خاص از سازگارگرایی و مشروط به جدایی از شهودات اخلاقی ارائه میدهد.
این مقاله با مقدمهای درباره ویلیامز و بحث مسئولیت اخلاقی، به تبیین مفهوم و شرایط مسئولیت اخلاقی ویلیامز میپردازد.
سپس با نقد ویلیامز بر سازگارگرایان و ناسازگارگرایان، تقریر سازگارگرایی خاص او رابیان میکند.
در نهایت، با ارزیابی دیدگاه ویلیامز، آن را دیدگاهی به واقع جبرگرایانه و ناقض اختیار و مسئولیت اخلاقی دانسته و پایه مستندات و استدلالات آن را ضعیف مییابد.
به همین دلیل، پذیرفتن آن را دشوار و غیرقابل دفاع میداند.
the present article studies bernard williams's view on moral responsibility using an analytical-critical approach.
the discussion of moral responsibility includes the definition, conditions, and problem of moral responsibility.
in western philosophical texts, moral responsibility refers to the praise and blame of the agent by himself or others for an act he has committed.
this is while, according to our moral appetites and the theories based on them such as kant's, moral responsibility is conditioned on free action and every healthy human being has the capacity for moral understanding, the ability to act accordingly and to deserve moral praise and blame for one's actions as they all equally benefit from reason and free-will.
thus, the foundation of moral responsibility is empirical and safe from factors beyond control, that is, luck.
in addition, the problem of moral responsibility is the conflict of free-will or freedom and determinism, and different philosophers have theorized regarding the three approaches of compatibility, incompatibility, and impossibility.
bernard williams, a great philosopher on ethics with an aristotelian influence - though he does not seem to define moral responsibility as opposed to what has been mentioned - offers a completely different view of the conditions and problem of moral responsibility and challenges our moral intuitions and theories such as kant's and distinguishes between morality and ethics.
he considers voluntary action to be the result of deliberation and intention but by innovating the term moral luck and relying on it, he even considers human voluntary action to be influenced by constitutive luck (i.e.
the capacities, talents, and inner abilities of each person) and resultant luck (i.e.
various psychological, social, cultural, political, economical, etc.
factors which affect the outcome of actions).
therefore, by violating a completely voluntary act, he breaks the relation between freedom and moral responsibility and considers moral responsibility to be superficial or dependent on the concept of luck and gives it an empirical basis.
faced with the problem of moral responsibility, he criticizes compatibilists and incompatibilists in three ways.
according to williams, there is a misunderstanding in the concept of blame used by compatibilists and incompatibilists.
in addition, compatibilists must compromise between determinism, psychological concepts, and moral responsibility.
also, the compatibilists do not pay attention to the difference between what free-will is and the will we have.
on the other hand, incompatibilists have used determinism in the sense of fatalism.
finally, the incompatibilist view fails to establish a relationship between choice, intention, and action.
by claiming a compatibilist view that is safe from these problems, williams argues that there is a compromise between the above-mentioned items if we separate ourselves from our moral intuitions and the present ethics.
this article explains williams' moral responsibility, with an introduction to williams and moral responsibility.
it then describes williams' compatibilism while also expresses his critique of compatibilism and incompatibilism.
finally, by assessing williams's view, it concludes it to be a truly deterministic view that violates freedom and moral responsibility and the basis of its evidence and arguments as weak.
for this reason, it is difficult and indefensible to accept it.