موردی برای زمینه‌گرایی: معرفت، شک‌گرایی و زمینه جلد اول [کتاب انگلیسی] | کتابخانه مجازی الفبا

Table of contents :
Contents......Page 11
1. Contextualism and the Old Bank Cases......Page 16
2. Cases Involving Speakers in Different Conversations Talking about the Same Subject......Page 18
3. Contextualism and Invariantism......Page 21
4. ‘Strength of Epistemic Position’, Comparative Conditionals, and Generic Contextualism......Page 22
5. Semantic Mechanism?......Page 24
6. Which Claims to Take Seriously and the ‘Floor’ of ‘Know(s)’......Page 28
7. Is This Epistemology or Philosophy of Language?......Page 33
8. Contextualism Regarding Other Epistemic Terms......Page 34
9. Contextualism is Not a Thesis about the Structure of Knowledge or of Justification......Page 36
10. ‘Subject’ vs. ‘Attributor’ Contextualism......Page 37
11. Intellectualism and the Distinction between ‘Classical’ and ‘Subject-Sensitive’ Invariantism......Page 38
12. A Brief History of Contextualism......Page 41
13. Contextualism, Invariantism, and Relevant Alternatives......Page 44
14. Against Contextualist Versions of RA That Tie the Content of Knowledge Attributing Claim Directly to What the Range of Relevant Alternatives Is......Page 49
15. Against Contrastivism......Page 53
16. The Contextualist Approach to Skepticism and to What Goes on in Ordinary Conversation......Page 56
17. Relativism, Fervent Invariantism, and the Plan for this Volume......Page 58
1. The Main Argument for Contextualism......Page 62
2. Mutually Reinforcing Strands of Evidence......Page 64
3. Truth/Falsity Asymmetry......Page 67
4. The Best Cases: Standards Appropriate to Practical Context......Page 68
5. The Best Cases: Cases Involving No Dispute, No Reversals, and No Exceedingly High, ‘Philosophical’ Standards......Page 71
6. Problems with First-Person Cases......Page 74
7. Third-Person Cases......Page 76
8. The Importance of Arguments from Ordinary Language......Page 81
Appendix. Similar Arguments for Other Contextualisms: But I Still Don’t Know Who Hong Oak Yun Is!......Page 84
3. Assertion, Knowledge, and Context......Page 95
1. The Classical Invariantist’s Warranted Assertability Objection......Page 96
2. The Myth of Jank Fraction: A Cautionary Tale......Page 98
3. Lame WAMs and the Warranted Assertability Objection to Contextualism......Page 100
4. The Generality Objection......Page 104
5. The Knowledge Account of Assertion......Page 107
6. The Knowledge Account of Assertion Contextualized......Page 113
7. Assertability and Knowledge: Getting the Connection Right......Page 117
8. The Argument from Variable Assertability Conditions......Page 121
9. An Argument for Contextualism?......Page 122
10. The Generality Objection Defeated......Page 124
11. Check the Negations!......Page 127
Appendix: Rysiew’s and Unger’s Invariantist Accounts......Page 132
1. Contextualism and Philosophical Debates over Skepticism......Page 143
2. Contextualism and Disagreement......Page 144
3. The Type of Debate Addressed Here......Page 146
4. Multiple, Personal Scoreboards......Page 149
5. Single Scoreboard Semantics......Page 150
6. Higher Standards Prevail, So the Skeptic Wins......Page 151
7. Does It Matter if the Skeptic ‘Wins’?......Page 153
8. Veto Power......Page 155
9. Reasonableness Views: Pure Reasonableness and ‘Binding Arbitration’......Page 156
10. The Exploding Scoreboard......Page 158
11. The ‘Gap’ View......Page 159
12. One-Way Disputes and the Asymmetrical Gap View......Page 163
13. The Asymmetrical Gap View Applied to Relations between Earlier and Later Claims Made during the Same Two-Way Dispute......Page 165
14. Is There a Good Objection to Contextualism to be Found in its Inability to Handle Cases of Disagreement?......Page 166
1. Methodology, Straightforward Data, and Objections to Contextualism Based on Fancier Features of Ordinary Usage......Page 168
2. The Objection from Judgements of Comparative Content......Page 170
3. ‘Semantic Blindness’: Get Used to It!......Page 174
4. The Objection from Metalinguistic Claims......Page 175
5. Hawthorne and Belief Reports......Page 176
6. ‘Know(s)’ and ‘Tall’: A Better Objection Involving Belief Reports......Page 181
7. ‘Know(s)’ and ‘Tall’: Some Speech Reports......Page 185
8. ‘Know(s)’ and ‘Tall’: ‘I Never Said That!’......Page 186
9. ‘Know(s)’ and ‘Tall’: Summary......Page 188
10. Schiffer’s Attack on Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism: Being ‘Bamboozled by our Own Words’......Page 189
Appendix: An Objection to Contextualism from a (Relative) Lack of Clarifying Devices for ‘Know(s)’?......Page 195
1. Intellectualism, SSI, and Contextualism......Page 200
2. The Problem with Denying Intellectualism......Page 204
3. Stakes and Confidence Levels......Page 205
4. ‘Now You Know It, Now You Don’t’ Problems......Page 209
5. KAA to the Rescue?......Page 211
6. Does SSI Have Good Company in its Misery?......Page 212
7. Contextualism and the Advantages of Intellectualism......Page 213
8. Contextualism and Simple ‘Now You Know It, Now You Don’t’ Sentences: The Apparent Problem and Two Unsatisfying Contextualist Responses......Page 214
9. Why Contextualism Does Not Endorse the Simple ‘Now You Know It, Now You Don’t’ Sentences......Page 219
10. The Fortified Objection: ‘What I Said’......Page 221
11. Elusive Knowledge?......Page 227
12. Lewis and Semantic Ascent......Page 230
13. The Fallacy of Semantic Descent......Page 232
14. Dretske and the Fallacy of Semantic Descent?......Page 237
1. Contextualism, SSI, and First-Person Cases......Page 241
2. Third-Person Cases that Vindicate Contextualism......Page 245
3. The Projection Defense......Page 249
4. Other Third-Person Cases: A Big, Ugly Tie?......Page 253
5. Some Uses of ‘Know(s)’ in Evaluating, Explaining, and Predicting Actions and Assertions......Page 256
6. Hawthorne’s Charges that Contextualism Breaks the Connections that Knowledge Bears to Assertion and to Practical Reasoning......Page 258
7. Contextualism and Some Strange Sentences Concerning Knowledge and Assertability......Page 259
8. Contextualism and Hawthorne’s Strange Sentence Concerning Knowledge and Practical Reasoning......Page 266
9. Can the Contextualist Claim that Knowledge Is the Norm of Assertion?......Page 272
10. Principles Connecting Knowledge with Action......Page 277
11. Multi-tasking and the Case of the Walking Talker......Page 284
12. Contextualism’s Advantage over SSI in Accounting for Uses of ‘Know(s)’ Made in Connection with Evaluations, Predictions, and Explanations of Actions......Page 288
13. The Need for the Flexibility Contextualism Posits......Page 291
References......Page 293
E......Page 300
M......Page 301
T......Page 302
Z......Page 303