روش پدیدارشناسی هوسرلی معرفت‌شناسی تحلیلی معرفت‌شناسی پدیدارشناختی مفهوم پدیدارشناختی توجیه تجربی توجیه تجربی پدیدارشناسی هوسرلی ارتباط پدیدارشناسی هوسرلی با معرفت شناسی تحلیلی English Springer 2022 The Justificatory Force of Experiences: From a Phenomenological Epistemology to the Foundations of Mathematics and Physics (Synthese Library, 459) Table of contents :,Acknowledgments,Introduction,Contents,Part I: A Phenomenological Conception of Experiential Justification,Chapter 1: Motivating PCEJ,1.1 What Is PCEJ?,1.2 Initial Motivation for PCEJ,1.3 Motivating PCEJ via a Recent Controversy,1.4 Defending PCEJ Against a Recent Objection,Chapter 2: Perceptual Justification,2.1 Different Versions of PCEJ in Current Analytic Epistemology,2.2 Epistemic Desiderata: Problems for Current Versions of PCEJ,2.2.1 Degrees of Justification,2.2.2 Empty Seemings,2.2.2.1 Cognitive Malfunction,2.2.3 Phenomenological Adequacy,2.2.3.1 Wishful Thinking,2.3 Phenomenology of Self-Givenness,2.3.1 The Basic Idea,2.3.2 Clarifications,2.4 Fulfilling the Epistemic Desiderata,Chapter 3: Intuitional Justification,3.1 Perceptual Learning,3.2 What Are Intuitions?,3.3 Mathematical Intuitions: Towards a Phenomenological Clarification,3.4 Intuitional Learning,3.5 Cases of Intuitional Learning,3.5.1 Prime Number,3.5.2 Pythagoras,3.6 Intuition vs. Strong Conviction: Negative Multiplication,3.7 Epistemological Lessons from Intuitional Learning,Chapter 4: How to Supplement Mentalist Evidentialism: Phenomenological Principles Are the Fundamental Epistemological Principl...,4.1 Introducing and Motivating Mentalist Evidentialism,4.2 Best Explanationism,4.3 Problems for Explanationism,4.3.1 Is EME Internalist?,4.3.2 EME Is Neither Foundationalist Nor Coherentist,4.3.3 The Charge of Overintellectualization,4.3.4 Degrees of Justification Made Difficult,4.3.5 Is Epistemic Justification Grounded in Non-normative Terms?,4.4 Phenomenological Mentalist Evidentialism,4.5 Virtues of PME,4.5.1 PME Is Internalist,4.5.2 PME Is Foundationalist,4.5.3 No Overintellectualization,4.5.4 Degrees of Justification Made Easy,4.5.5 Experiential Justification Is Grounded in Non-normative Terms!,Part II: Husserl as a Proponent of PCEJ,Chapter 5: Husserl as a Moderate Foundationalist,5.1 What Is Moderate Foundationalism?,5.1.1 Different Versions of Foundationalism,5.1.2 The Most Promising Version of Foundationalism,5.2 Husserl´s Moderate Foundationalism,5.2.1 Husserl´s Conception of Intuition,5.2.2 Intuition as a Source of Immediate Yet Fallible Justification,5.2.3 Husserl´s Version of Moderate Foundationalism,5.2.4 An Analysis of and Response to Opposing Interpretations,Chapter 6: The Nature and Systematic Role of Evidence: Husserl as a Proponent of Mentalist Evidentialism,6.1 Husserl on the Systematic Role of Evidence - Evidence Determines Epistemic Justification,6.2 Husserl on the Nature of Evidence,6.3 Evidentialism and Mentalism in Current Analytic Epistemology,6.4 Prospect: Phenomenological Principles as Basic Epistemological Principles,Chapter 7: Husserl´s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters,7.1 Some Phenomenological-Epistemological Principles,7.2 Husserl´s Conception of Experiential Justification,7.3 Revisiting Husserl´s Advantages,Chapter 8: Husserl´s Universal Empiricism as a Moderate Rationalism,8.1 Husserl´s Universal Empiricism,8.2 What Is Moderate Rationalism?,8.3 Fallibility and Corrigibility of A Priori Justification,Chapter 9: Husserl´s Phenomenological Intuitionism,9.1 The Distinctiveness of Husserl´s Conception of Eidetic Intuition,9.2 Husserl´s Conception of Intuitional Justification,9.3 The Phenomenal Character of Apodicticity,9.4 Exemplifying the Phenomenal Character of Apodicticity,Part III: Transcendental Phenomenology as the Ultimate Science,Chapter 10: Transcendental Phenomenology as an Epistemological Project,10.1 The Transcendental Turn and the Charge of Psychologism,10.2 Husserl´s Ways to the Transcendental Reduction,10.3 Prospect: Motivating Transcendental Phenomenology by Engaging with Current Analytic Epistemology,Chapter 11: New Ways to Transcendental Phenomenology,11.1 The Cornerstones of Transcendental Phenomenology,11.2 Steps Towards Transcendental Phenomenology,11.3 New Ways to Transcendental Phenomenology,11.3.1 The New Evil Demon Problem Revisited,11.3.2 Clairvoyance Revisited,11.3.3 Blindsight Revisited,11.4 Epistemic Thought Experiments and the Method of Eidetic Variation,11.5 Eidetic Intuition and Value-Ception,Chapter 12: Transcendental Phenomenology as the Project of Ultimate Elucidation,12.1 Husserl´s Phenomenology as a Subjective Science of the Ultimate Epistemological Principles,12.2 The Ultimate Epistemological Principle and Ultimate Elucidation,12.3 The Accessibility of PaP,12.4 The Role of UEP Within a Phenomenological Epistemology,Part IV: The Phenomenological Foundations of the Individual Sciences,Chapter 13: Sources of Knowledge: The Correlational Apriori,13.1 How Phenomenology Paves the Way for Intra- and Interdisciplinary Research,13.2 The Correlational a Priori,13.3 Sources of Knowledge,13.3.1 Perceptual Experiences,13.3.2 Introspective Intuitions,13.3.3 Rational Intuitions,13.3.4 Evaluative Experiences,Chapter 14: The Phenomenological Foundations of Mathematics: Introducing a Phenomenological Intuitionism,14.1 Prelude to a Phenomenology of Mathematics and Revisiting Mathematical Intuitions,14.2 The Role of Intuitions in Picture Proofs,14.3 The Role of Intuitions in Symbolic Proofs,14.4 The Building Blocks of PMI,14.5 The Relationship Between Axioms and Intuitions,Chapter 15: Phenomenological Approaches to Physics,15.1 Mathematizing Nature? The Epistemic Role of the Life-World and Our Experiences,15.2 No View from Nowhere: Husserl´s Phenomenological Perspectivism,15.2.1 The Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experiences,15.2.2 The Perspectival Character of Scientific Theories,15.2.3 Scientific Perspectivism in Current Debates,15.3 Phenomenological Motifs in the Origin of the Gauge Principle and Early Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics,15.3.1 Hermann Weyl and the Gauge Principle,15.3.2 Fritz London and Quantum Mechanics,15.4 Phenomenological Motifs in J. A. Wheeler and Observer-Dependence in Modern Physics,15.5 Phenomenological Motifs in QBism and in the Informational Reconstruction of Quantum Theory,15.5.1 QBism,15.5.2 The Informational Reconstruction of Quantum Theory,Conclusion,Bibliography,I References to the Husserliana Edition,II Further References,Index text برگوفر, فیلیپ (Philipp Berghofer) Author Philipp Berghofer Author book portal_lib 1402-09-01 1402-09-01