00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000Eng00مطالعات آکسفورد در فلسفه دین جلد نهم [کتاب انگلیسی]Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Table of contents : Cover Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 9 Copyright Contents Preface List of Contributors 1: Privation in the Problem of Evil: Impairment, Health, Well-Being, and a Case of Humans and Betazoids 1. Introduction 2. The Test Case: Betazoids and Humans 3. Definitions: Disability, Impairment, and Health 4. A Solution to the Puzzle 5. Privative Evils and Theodicy 6. A Confusion? 7. Where Are We Now? Bibliography 2: What If God Makes Hard Choices? 1. Swinburne’s Model 2. A Challenge to Swinburne’s Model 3. A New Model 4. An Advantage 5. A Disadvantage 3: Theism, Pro-Theism, Hasker, and Gratuitous Evil 1. Stage-Setting 2. Restrictions on God’s Permission of Evil 3. Hasker’s Case Against (1) 4. Must Gratuitous Evil Occur, or Must it Merely be Permitted? 5. Criticisms of Hasker’s Argument 5.1 The strategy is self-defeating 5.2 The account of God’s plan for creation in (e) is mistaken 5.3 If God were to prevent all gratuitous evil, we would neither know nor reasonably believe that God had done so 5.4 Our moral motivations would not be undermined 6. Conclusion Appendix: The Argument From Excessive Gratuitous Evil References 4: God and Gratuitous Evil: A Response to Klaas Kraay 1. Preliminaries 2. The NGE Defense 3. The Problem of Moral Motivation 4. The Problem of Excessive Gratuitous Evil 5. Conclusion 5: Moral Indulgences: When Offsetting is Wrong 0. Introduction 1. Moral Indulgence 2. The Moral Status of Moral Indulgence 2.1 Two desiderata and what can’t meet them 2.2 Universalizability and the second desideratum 2.3 Application of universalizability and the first desideratum 2.4 Cause-matching 3. Divine Indulgence 3.1 Background assumptions 3.2 Divine indulgence 3.3 Universalizability and divergence on the divine 4. Closing Thoughts Bibliography 6: Time of Trial Time of Trial 7: Why Did The One Not Remain Within Itself? I. Introduction II. A Framework For Our Inquiry III. Why Did God Create? IV. Could God Have Had Any Completely Adequate But Non-Coercive Reason To Create? V. The Solution to the Aporia of Contingent Creation VI. The Need for a Further Traditional Resource VII. Need the Weights of Various Reasons Add for the Problem to Arise? VIII. The Way Forward IX. The Transfinite Alternative X. Cantor on the Transfinite and the Absolute XI. The Aporia Resolved XII. The Upshot for Theology XIII. An Inventory of Kinds of Normative Reasons XIV. Immediate Elimination of Four Kinds of Normative Reasons XV. Did God Create out of Reasons of Personal Attachment? XVI. Creating from Reasons of Love XVII. Did Generosity Provide God with Reason to Create? XVIII. There Could Not Be Melioristic Reasons to Create XIX. Ameliorism XX. “To Show Forth His Goodness” XXI. Manifestationism XXII. How Mistaken We Have Been About What Matters XXIII. How Corrosive is Ameliorism when it Comes to Other Sorts of Reasons? XXIV. One Extant Solution to the Corrosive Effect of Ameliorism 8: Organic Unities, Summation, and the Problem of Evil 1. The Principle of Organic Unities and the Thesis of Universality 2. Chisholm on Defeat and the Problem of Evil 3. Is the View That There Are Organic Unities Incoherent? 4. Does the Moorean View Lead to Evaluative Schizophrenia? 5. The Objection from Evaluative Inadequacy Bibliography 9: Organic Unities and the Problem of Evil: A Reply to Lemos I II III IV V References 10: Unrestricted Actualization and Divine Providence 1. Interpreting Almeida’s Core Ideas about U-actualization 2. The Significance of U-actualizationfor the Theory of Goodness 3. Evaluation of Almeida’s Argument for (3b) 3.2 Should we accept premise (1b)? References 11: Unrestricted Actualization and Perfect Worlds: A Reply to Langtry 1. Introduction 2. Langtry’s Objections to U-Actualization 2.1 Langtry’s Objection to (2b) 2.2 Langtry’s Objections to (1b) 12: Prediction and Providence: Rejoinder to Almeida’s Reply 1. Almeida’s Reply to my Objection to (2b) 2. Almeida’s Reply to my Objection to (1b) 2.1 The argument from God’s essential comprehensive knowledge 2.2 The argument from divine practical rationality References 13: A Naturalistic Intrinsic Value Theodicy 1. Introduction 2. Creaturely Freedom 3. The Distribution of Intrinsic Value 4. Organic Unity and the World as a Whole 5. Objections: Value, Existence, Death, Pain 6. Conclusion References Index فلسفه دین دین پژوهی Swenson, Philip Author زیمرمن, دین (Dean Zimmerman، فیلسوف آمریکایی، استاد فلسفه در دانشگاه راتگرز «Rutgers University» در نیوجرسی آمریکا، متخصص در متافیزیک و فلسفه دین) Author Buchak, Lara Author book marcgt 9780198845492