00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000Eng00نیروی توجیهی تجربیات: از معرفت شناسی پدیدارشناختی تا مبانی ریاضیات و فیزیک [کتاب انگلیسی]SpringerSpringerThe Justificatory Force of Experiences: From a Phenomenological Epistemology to the Foundations of Mathematics and Physics (Synthese Library, 459)Table of contents : Acknowledgments Introduction Contents Part I: A Phenomenological Conception of Experiential Justification Chapter 1: Motivating PCEJ 1.1 What Is PCEJ? 1.2 Initial Motivation for PCEJ 1.3 Motivating PCEJ via a Recent Controversy 1.4 Defending PCEJ Against a Recent Objection Chapter 2: Perceptual Justification 2.1 Different Versions of PCEJ in Current Analytic Epistemology 2.2 Epistemic Desiderata: Problems for Current Versions of PCEJ 2.2.1 Degrees of Justification 2.2.2 Empty Seemings 2.2.2.1 Cognitive Malfunction 2.2.3 Phenomenological Adequacy 2.2.3.1 Wishful Thinking 2.3 Phenomenology of Self-Givenness 2.3.1 The Basic Idea 2.3.2 Clarifications 2.4 Fulfilling the Epistemic Desiderata Chapter 3: Intuitional Justification 3.1 Perceptual Learning 3.2 What Are Intuitions? 3.3 Mathematical Intuitions: Towards a Phenomenological Clarification 3.4 Intuitional Learning 3.5 Cases of Intuitional Learning 3.5.1 Prime Number 3.5.2 Pythagoras 3.6 Intuition vs. Strong Conviction: Negative Multiplication 3.7 Epistemological Lessons from Intuitional Learning Chapter 4: How to Supplement Mentalist Evidentialism: Phenomenological Principles Are the Fundamental Epistemological Principl... 4.1 Introducing and Motivating Mentalist Evidentialism 4.2 Best Explanationism 4.3 Problems for Explanationism 4.3.1 Is EME Internalist? 4.3.2 EME Is Neither Foundationalist Nor Coherentist 4.3.3 The Charge of Overintellectualization 4.3.4 Degrees of Justification Made Difficult 4.3.5 Is Epistemic Justification Grounded in Non-normative Terms? 4.4 Phenomenological Mentalist Evidentialism 4.5 Virtues of PME 4.5.1 PME Is Internalist 4.5.2 PME Is Foundationalist 4.5.3 No Overintellectualization 4.5.4 Degrees of Justification Made Easy 4.5.5 Experiential Justification Is Grounded in Non-normative Terms! Part II: Husserl as a Proponent of PCEJ Chapter 5: Husserl as a Moderate Foundationalist 5.1 What Is Moderate Foundationalism? 5.1.1 Different Versions of Foundationalism 5.1.2 The Most Promising Version of Foundationalism 5.2 Husserl´s Moderate Foundationalism 5.2.1 Husserl´s Conception of Intuition 5.2.2 Intuition as a Source of Immediate Yet Fallible Justification 5.2.3 Husserl´s Version of Moderate Foundationalism 5.2.4 An Analysis of and Response to Opposing Interpretations Chapter 6: The Nature and Systematic Role of Evidence: Husserl as a Proponent of Mentalist Evidentialism 6.1 Husserl on the Systematic Role of Evidence - Evidence Determines Epistemic Justification 6.2 Husserl on the Nature of Evidence 6.3 Evidentialism and Mentalism in Current Analytic Epistemology 6.4 Prospect: Phenomenological Principles as Basic Epistemological Principles Chapter 7: Husserl´s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters 7.1 Some Phenomenological-Epistemological Principles 7.2 Husserl´s Conception of Experiential Justification 7.3 Revisiting Husserl´s Advantages Chapter 8: Husserl´s Universal Empiricism as a Moderate Rationalism 8.1 Husserl´s Universal Empiricism 8.2 What Is Moderate Rationalism? 8.3 Fallibility and Corrigibility of A Priori Justification Chapter 9: Husserl´s Phenomenological Intuitionism 9.1 The Distinctiveness of Husserl´s Conception of Eidetic Intuition 9.2 Husserl´s Conception of Intuitional Justification 9.3 The Phenomenal Character of Apodicticity 9.4 Exemplifying the Phenomenal Character of Apodicticity Part III: Transcendental Phenomenology as the Ultimate Science Chapter 10: Transcendental Phenomenology as an Epistemological Project 10.1 The Transcendental Turn and the Charge of Psychologism 10.2 Husserl´s Ways to the Transcendental Reduction 10.3 Prospect: Motivating Transcendental Phenomenology by Engaging with Current Analytic Epistemology Chapter 11: New Ways to Transcendental Phenomenology 11.1 The Cornerstones of Transcendental Phenomenology 11.2 Steps Towards Transcendental Phenomenology 11.3 New Ways to Transcendental Phenomenology 11.3.1 The New Evil Demon Problem Revisited 11.3.2 Clairvoyance Revisited 11.3.3 Blindsight Revisited 11.4 Epistemic Thought Experiments and the Method of Eidetic Variation 11.5 Eidetic Intuition and Value-Ception Chapter 12: Transcendental Phenomenology as the Project of Ultimate Elucidation 12.1 Husserl´s Phenomenology as a Subjective Science of the Ultimate Epistemological Principles 12.2 The Ultimate Epistemological Principle and Ultimate Elucidation 12.3 The Accessibility of PaP 12.4 The Role of UEP Within a Phenomenological Epistemology Part IV: The Phenomenological Foundations of the Individual Sciences Chapter 13: Sources of Knowledge: The Correlational Apriori 13.1 How Phenomenology Paves the Way for Intra- and Interdisciplinary Research 13.2 The Correlational a Priori 13.3 Sources of Knowledge 13.3.1 Perceptual Experiences 13.3.2 Introspective Intuitions 13.3.3 Rational Intuitions 13.3.4 Evaluative Experiences Chapter 14: The Phenomenological Foundations of Mathematics: Introducing a Phenomenological Intuitionism 14.1 Prelude to a Phenomenology of Mathematics and Revisiting Mathematical Intuitions 14.2 The Role of Intuitions in Picture Proofs 14.3 The Role of Intuitions in Symbolic Proofs 14.4 The Building Blocks of PMI 14.5 The Relationship Between Axioms and Intuitions Chapter 15: Phenomenological Approaches to Physics 15.1 Mathematizing Nature? The Epistemic Role of the Life-World and Our Experiences 15.2 No View from Nowhere: Husserl´s Phenomenological Perspectivism 15.2.1 The Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experiences 15.2.2 The Perspectival Character of Scientific Theories 15.2.3 Scientific Perspectivism in Current Debates 15.3 Phenomenological Motifs in the Origin of the Gauge Principle and Early Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics 15.3.1 Hermann Weyl and the Gauge Principle 15.3.2 Fritz London and Quantum Mechanics 15.4 Phenomenological Motifs in J. A. Wheeler and Observer-Dependence in Modern Physics 15.5 Phenomenological Motifs in QBism and in the Informational Reconstruction of Quantum Theory 15.5.1 QBism 15.5.2 The Informational Reconstruction of Quantum Theory Conclusion Bibliography I References to the Husserliana Edition II Further References Index روش پدیدارشناسی هوسرلی معرفت‌شناسی تحلیلی معرفت‌شناسی پدیدارشناختی مفهوم پدیدارشناختی توجیه تجربی توجیه تجربی پدیدارشناسی هوسرلی ارتباط پدیدارشناسی هوسرلی با معرفت شناسی تحلیلی برگوفر, فیلیپ (Philipp Berghofer) Author book marcgt portal_lib local