مطالعات آکسفورد در فلسفه دین جلد هفتم [کتاب انگلیسی] Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 7 فلسفه دین دین پژوهی English Oxford University Press 2016 Table of contents :,COVER,OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: VOLUME 7,COPYRIGHT,CONTENTS,LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS,EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION,Chapter 1: Evil and Evidence,I. INTRODUCTION,II. A PROBABILISTIC VIEW OF EVIDENTIAL STRENGTH,III. THE PROBLEM OF PARADISE,IV. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND THE PROBLEM OF IGNORANCE,V. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL FOR RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS,VI. SEEMINGS AND CORNEA,VI.1. CORNEA Holding Experiences Fixed,VI.2. CORNEA Letting Experiences Vary,VII. RADICAL UNCERTAINTY ABOUT PRIOR PROBABILITIES,VIII. TWO KINDS OF “GRATUITOUSNESS” (BOTH GRATUITOUS) AND TWO KINDS OF “POINTLESSNESS” (BOTH POINTLESS),IX. LEVERING EVIDENCE,X. THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF GOODS,XI. THE PHENOMENAL CONCEPTION OF EVIDENCE,XII. KNOWLEDGE AS EVIDENCE: E=K,XII.1. Knowledge of Theism,XII.2. Knowledge of Atheism,XIII. CONCLUSION,REFERENCES,Chapter 2: Is Petitionary Prayer Superfluous?,I. SUSPICIONS OF SUPERFLUITY,II. ATTEMPTS TO GIVE REASONS FOR PETITIONARY PRAYER,II.1. Eleonore Stump,II.2. Michael Murray and Kurt Meyers,III. A PROPOSAL,III.1. Leaving Room for the Effects of Prayer,III.2. Rewards and Punishments,III.3. Acts of Love,III.4. Spiritual Growth,IV. REFINING THE PROPOSAL: OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES,IV.1. How Can We Know That God Has Answered Our Prayer?,IV.1.1. Scott Davison’s Skeptical Arguments,IV.1.2. Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder’s Responses to the Skeptical Argument,IV.1.3. Timing,IV.1.4. Specificity,IV.1.5. Internal Assurance,IV.1.6. A Statistical Inference,IV.2. Can We Love Others by Praying for Them?,IV.2.1. Davison’s Dilemma,IV.2.2. Who is Actually Responsible?,IV.2.3. Responsibility as Two-edged Sword? and Obstacles to Prayer,IV.3. A Relationship of Trust and Partnership,REFERENCES,Chapter 3: Where Skeptical Theism Fails, Skeptical Atheism Prevails,I. INTRODUCTION,II. SKEPTICAL THEISM,III. SKEPTICAL ATHEISM,III.1. What is Skeptical Atheism?,III.2. Rowe’s Challenge to Skeptical Atheism,III.3. Swinburne’s Challenge to Skeptical Atheism,IV. IMPLICATIONS,REFERENCES,Chapter 4: The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair: (Kantian) Ethics and the Need for Hope in God,I. KANT ON MORALITY,II. KANT ON HAPPINESS,III. INTERLUDE: EVERYONE’S PROBLEM,IV. KANT ON RELIGION,V. CONCLUSION,APPENDIX: ALTERNATIVE READINGS OF KANT’S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION,A. MOTIVATIONAL VIEWS,B. THE REQUIRED ENDS AND WOOD ON THE RELIGION,REFERENCES,Chapter 5: A Problem with Theistic Hope,BEHAVIORS AND BELIEFS,THE PROBLEM OF CATCHING BELIEF,INOCULATION AND CORROSION,TWO CASE STUDIES,Chapter 6: Religious Skepticism and Higher-Order Evidence,I. INTRODUCTION,II. THE ARGUMENT FROM PEER DISAGREEMENT,III. A CUMULATIVE ARGUMENT FROM HIGHER-ORDER EVIDENCE,III.1. The Argument Sketched,III.2. The Argument Stated Explicitly,IV. EVALUATING THE ARGUMENT,IV.1. Inadequate Replies,IV.2. Toward a More Adequate Reply,V. CONCLUDING REMARKS,REFERENCES,Chapter 7: Temporary Intrinsics and Christological Predication,I. INTRODUCTION,II. THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORARY INTRINSICS,III. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORARY INTRINSICS,III.1. Taking Tense Seriously (T),III.2. Modification of the Whole Assertion (A),III.3. Modification of the Subject (S),III.4. Modification of the Predicate (P),III.5. Modification of the Copula (C),III.6. Summary of Responses,IV. THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL INTRINSICS,V. ANALOGOUS SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL INTRINSICS,V.1. Taking Tense Seriously (T),V.2. Modification of the Whole Assertion (A),V.3. Modification of the Subject (S),V.4. Modification of the Predicate (P),V.5. Modification of the Copula (C),V.6. Relative Identity (R),V.7. Summary of Responses,VI. CONCLUSION,REFERENCES,Chapter 8: Can God Repent?,I. INTRODUCTION,II. THE BIBLE ON GOD’S REPENTANCE,III. THE PARADOX OF DIVINE REPENTANCE,IV. OPEN THEISM AND GEACHIANISM AS RESPONSES TO THE PARADOX OF DIVINE REPENTANCE,IV.1. First Response: Open Theism,IV.2. Second Response: Geachianism,V. A NEW RESPONSE TO THE PARADOX OF DIVINE REPENTANCE,VI. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES,VII. IMPLICATIONS,VIII. CONCLUSION,REFERENCES,Chapter 9: Divine Creative Freedom,I. PROBLEMS,II. VALUE COMPARISONS AND INCOMMENSURABILITY,III. FIVE SOURCES OF INCOMMENSURABILITY,III.1. Different Kinds of Values,III.2. Differences between Possessors,III.3. Pursuing Good versus Avoiding Bad,III.4. Aggregating Utilities between Persons,III.5. Risk and Chance,IV. INCOMMENSURABILITY AND THE EXPLANATION OF ACTIONS,V. GOD, CREATION, AND INCOMMENSURABILITY,V.1. From Weak to Strong Incommensurability,V.2. NOMAX and No Necessary Creation,V.3. Divine Creative Freedom (DCF),V.4. Omnipotence,V.5. Strong and Weak Actualization,VI. CONCLUSIONS,APPENDIX: HAUSDORFF PARADOX AND INCOMMENSURABILITY,REFERENCES,Chapter 10: The Permissibility of the Atonement as Penal Substitution,I. THE PROBLEM WITH PENAL SUBSTITUTION,II. THE FIRST TWO CONDITIONS,III. MEETING CONDITION 1): WE CANNOT BEAR THE PUNISHMENT FOR OUR SIN,IV. MEETING CONDITION 2): CHRIST CAN AND IS WILLING TO BEAR THE PUNISHMENT FOR OUR SIN,V. THE THIRD CONDITION,V.1. Motivating Condition 3): The Leniency Objection,V.2. The Expressive Function of Punishment,V.3. Overcoming the Leniency Objection via Condition 3),VI. THE FOURTH CONDITION,VI.1. Motivating Condition 4),VI.2. Condition 4) and the Atonement: Conceiving of Sin as Moral Debt,VI.3. Condition 4) and the Atonement: Conceiving of Sin as an Ontological and Relational Problem, and Bringing in the Participatory Model of the Atonement,VII. WHY THE ATONEMENT AS PENAL SUBSTITUTION IS PERMISSIBLE,VIII. WEAKENING CONDITION 3),IX. CONCLUSION,ACKNOWLEDGMENTS,Index text کوانویگ, جاناتان(استاد فلسفه دین و معرفت شناسی ، دانشگاه واشنگتن، سنت لوئیس آمریکا), 1954# book 9780198757702